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This paper reviews the literature in the fields of learning, knowledge creation 
and storage in organisations and links the theories in these fields to mergers 
and acquisitions. Specifically, mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of East 
German ex-combines by western firms are examined from the viewpoint of - 
does the dominant culture always win or is it possible for two-way learning? 
The answer to these questions seems to depend upon the mode of acquisition, the 
level of acculturation and on the length of time elapsed. These three factors and 
others are combined into a model to predict potential results of M&As. The 
theory section is supported by data collected from six western M&As in East 
Germany where a total of 36 in-depth, open ended interviews were held. 
Dem vorliegenden Artikel wird ein Literaturüberblick zum organisationalen 
Lernen sowie der Wissenserzeugung und -speicherung von Wissen in 
Organisationen vorangestellt. Die entsprechenden Theorien werden auf das 
Spezialthema dieser JEEMS-Ausgabe übertragen. Es werden Übernahmen von 
ostdeutschen Kombinaten durch westliche Unternehmen untersucht. Folgende 
Frage steht dabei im Mittelpunkt: Gewinnt immer die dominante Kultur oder ist 
auch ein wechselseitiges Lernen möglich? Die Art des Zukaufs, der 
wahrgenommene Grad der Akkulturation und die seit der Übernahme 
vergangene Zeit scheinen hierauf Einfluß zu haben. Es wird ein Arbeitsmodell 
entwickelt, um die möglichen Folgen von Unternehmenszusammenschlüssen 
vorhersagen zu können. Aussagen aus 36 Interviews in sechs untersuchten 
ostdeutschen Betrieben bekräftigen die theoretischen Vorannahmen. 
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1 Introduction10 
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 a period of massive social and economic 
change was ushered into East Germany. The arrival of western owners and 
managerial systems in East Germany offers a rare opportunity to study radical 
organisational change within the context of societal upheaval in an advanced but 
restructuring economy. The context of the research is shaped by well known 
macro and micro factors which have affected East Germany. At the society level 
there are the effects of: reunification, monetary union, new legal system, 
privatisation which included the break up of state combines, and sweeping rises 
in unemployment. The micro level effects include: Up to 80% downsizing of 
work force, competition affecting work intensity and cost awareness, the 
breakdown of the work group and the rise of individualisation at the work place. 
All the above elements reflect one commonality for East Germans - a large 
increase in uncertainty. 
2 Learning and Knowledge in Organisations 
Knowledge has long been recognised as one of the key factors in the creation of 
economic wealth within societies (Hayek 1945; Marshall 1965; Penrose 1959; 
Stigler 1968; Teece 1977). An increasing number of authors are coming to view 
the creation and/or application of knowledge as a key function of the firm 
(Argyris/ Schon 1978; Grant 1996b; Hamel/ Prahalad 1990; Senge 1993). We 
can observe that fundamentally different knowledge creation and application 
strategies were employed by organisations in the East and firms in the West after 
World War II. 
With the collapse of communism these two different forms of knowledge 
creation and application have come face to face through Mergers and 
Acquisitions, presenting opportunities and challenges for managers in the field. 
In this section we will first outline some of the basic elements of knowledge 
management, including the central issue of creation and deepening of knowledge 
bases. We will show how knowledge trajectories differed along these two 
elements in Eastern versus Western firms. We will then outline the opportunities 
and challenges faced by firms in merging these differing perspectives. The 
complexity of the task is increased by the fact that knowledge transfer and 
integration across firms is generally viewed as considerably more difficult than 
internal creation and application of a firms knowledge base. Core to the transfer 
and merging of knowledge across firms is acculturation, a theme which forms 
the centre piece of our empirical analysis which follows in later sections. 
                                          
10 Partial funding of this research by the Department of Business Administration, University 
College, Dublin is gratefully acknowledged. 
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2.1 Knowledge Management: Capabilities and Sustainable Competitive 
Advantage 
We view knowledge management as the process of creation, development, 
maintenance, expansion, contraction and decline of organisational capabilities. 
This is both because organisational capabilities are essentially knowledge based 
and they are the central element in the creation of Sustainable Competitive 
Advantage (SCA). Organisational capabilities are defined by Amit and 
Schoemaker (1993) as: information based, tangible, or intangible processes that 
are firm-specific and are developed over time through complex interactions 
amongst firms resources .... unlike resource, capabilities are based on 
developing, carrying and exchanging information through the firm's human 
capital. 
The most important capabilities are core capabilities. They are defined by Teece 
et al. (1990) as: a set of differential skills, complementary assets, and routines 
that provide the basis for a firm's competitive capacities and sustainable 
advantage in a particular business. The development of a core capability is a 
difficult task which requires the creation of new and novel combinations of a 
firm's resources and capabilities. As Hamel and Prahalad (1994) note: it may 
take five, ten, or more years to build a world leadership in a core competence 
area, consistency of effort is the key. It should be noted here that East and West 
Germany were separated for over four decades. Within this time their respective 
producers had the opportunity to create distinctive sets of core competencies.  
Sustainable Competitive Advantage (SCA) can be derived from resource or 
capabilities which are rare, imperfectly imitable, durable, and can be deployed in 
products and services (Barney 1991; Black/ Boal 1994; Connor 1991; Grant 
1991; Hamel/ Prahalad 1990). The goal of SCA is to obtain returns in excess of 
the resource owners cost of capital. The central source of SCA is core 
capabilities. 
The opposite to core capabilities are core rigidity (Leonard-Barton 1992). They 
are sets of knowledge which have been valuable sources of competitive 
advantage in the past but are now inappropriate to the future competitive game. 
Over time capabilities which have heralded success in the past may no longer 
offer the route to future success. As the firm seeks to create new capabilities 
which can produce improved products and services the old capabilities can 
hamper the effort to develop new ones. We argue in section 2.3 that core 
rigidities gradually pervaded the majority of East German industry, thus 
widening the competitive gap between them and the wider market driven world.  
2.2 Learning Races: Assumptions  
Central to our argument are the following set of assumptions.  
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The heart of knowledge creation is the individual (Argyris/ Schon 1978; Grant 
1996b; Huber 1991; Klein 1989; March 1991; Polanyi 1966; Simon 1991). The 
task of the firm in knowledge management is the co-ordination of individuals 
who alone could so not have sufficient knowledge and resource to build the 
complex products and services required in today's society (e.g. cars) but who 
combined can efficiently and effectively apply their knowledge to deliver such 
goods and services (Grant 1996a). The firm appropriates its return in the 
knowledge management process from its co-ordination of groups of individuals 
who jointly apply (and to a lesser extent jointly create) knowledge, thus we can 
see that the heart of knowledge application is the group. The role of the firm 
necessitates that knowledge creation and application will thus occur in a social 
environment (Blacker 1995; Nonaka 1994), however the core of knowledge 
creation will remain the individual. 
Unfortunately communism showed a tendency towards intolerance of 
individuality. Individuality tends to foster mavericks, people who dare to be 
different, or have a different view of how the world works. Mavericks may take 
contrary views in the area of what products and services firms should and could 
produce, a mixture of these are one of the key catalysts to avoid core rigidities 
(McNamara/ Baden-Fuller 1996). In a communist society it is much less likely 
that mavericks would have publicly exposed themselves in the workplace. 
Hence the danger of core rigidities was greater than in a society which tolerates, 
and in some cases (e.g. USA) embraces maverick behaviour.  
Over forty years long there existed a competitive race between East and West 
across multiple dimensions from sport, to politics, to science and technology. 
This can be viewed as a learning race, where each society sought to best the 
other with superior knowledge which could be applied into products and 
services for all the world to see (e.g. the Space Race, the Arms Race, the 
Olympics etc.). Some authors argue that the improvements in reliability that 
investments in learning capabilities bring comes at the price of reduced 
variability within the firm (Levinthal/ March 1993; March 1991). It is argued 
that the price of such reduced deviation within the firm is the chance to gain 
primacy in the competitive race. With lower explicit individual diversity East 
Germany firms may have sought to increase reliability but at the cost of 
variability, and hence innovation and learning. Reliability and variability can be 
seen as a duality or dilemma (Hampden-Turner 1990). The ability to manage 
these two conflicting pressures to obtain optimum results is a common problem 
for all organisations. 
Improvement in a firm's relative competitive position is affected by the number 
of competitors in the market and the variability of the strategies to gain success 
(March 1991). Thus if a firm wishes to maintain its relative position, 
employment of a learning strategy based around deepening current knowledge 
will work because it improves reliability. However, in the race for primacy, the 
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greater the number of competitors the greater the potential variability of 
strategies in the market, hence, the greater need for specific firms to encourage 
variability so that they might hit upon a successful strategy that attains market 
leadership.  
In the West there were many firms with competing strategies, hence creativity 
bubbled up. The East German system operated as a sort of single entity, GDR 
PLC if you like. In an environment where there are few firms the best strategy is 
that of specialisation. In the GDR the outputs of one producer fed into the inputs 
of another, controlled by political economic plans, rather than the market forces 
of managerial ingenuity. Whole industries were vertically integrated, while links 
across industries were fostered by the state. In an ideal world GDR PLC might 
have been able to greatly increase reliability at the cost of variability. Even then 
over a period of 45 years separation from the West it would have fallen ever 
further behind in the learning race, unless it allowed new ideas to filter into its 
system from the West. It did not generally allow this to happen, nor was the 
GDR PLC an ideal world - far from it. Based on the above assumptions we 
argue that ex-GDR firms would on average have much less to offer in a merger 
with a western firm in terms of strategic or operational creativity.  
However, there did exist factors in the ex-GDR which might suggest that on 
average they could have more to offer in the application of current knowledge in 
overcoming core rigidities. We will now examine in more detail why these 
points should be so. 
2.3 Core Rigidities and their Solutions 
The development of core rigidities tends to be path dependent (Cohen/ Levinthal 
1990; Collis 1991; Mahoney 1995). The core capability grows over time 
building on past successes, reinforcing behaviours that have lead to past success 
and embedding these deeper into the organisation. This enables the firm to refine 
its organisational routines, procedures and efficiency in knowledge integration. 
A problem emerges when new capabilities are developed by other firms which 
more effectively deliver products and services which society wants and is 
willing to pay for.  
In the GDR where whole industries were vertically integrated the development 
of a core rigidity in one part of the value chain could inhibit the value adding 
tasks of the entire network. With a policy of full-employment and no real means 
by which firms could go bankrupt, and thus die, core rigidities could not be 
removed from the system other than by pro-active management. The problem is 
that the mechanisms management could employ to remove core rigidities from 
the firm, were strongly discouraged by the state.  
There are good reasons why firms are reluctant to change capabilities without 
the threat of organisational death. The principle reason is the high switching 
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costs which may be involved in moving from one capability to another (Kogut/ 
Zander 1992). The interplay between bundles of resources and capabilities 
necessary to create a new core capability will, at the outset, be poorly 
understood since the creation of organisational knowledge is by definition a 
complex and uncertain process. Kogut and Zander (1992) articulate this risk in 
their study when they note that: Switching to new capabilities is difficult as 
neither the knowledge embedded in the current relationships and principles is 
well understood, nor the social fabric required to support the new learning 
known. This can be reinforced by the high levels of inertia within the firm and 
the high level of costs attached to investments in the exploration of new 
knowledge (Levinthal/ March 1993; March 1991; Huff et al. 1992). In East 
Germany the switching costs were very high due to the vertical integration of 
industries. If for example new production processes in coal production failed, 
then the knock on effect on electricity production would be considerable, and by 
extension the consumer production of the region. Switching costs, and the heavy 
cost of failure on a personal level when challenging the status quo, may have 
encouraged members of East German combines to continue to apply and expand 
their current knowledge to the problems the firm faced, rather than developing 
alternative solutions based on more efficient and effective knowledge bases. 
In addressing the challenge of core rigidities the firm is faced with three primary 
strategies:  
First, take a population ecology world view, accepting the onset of 
organisational decline that core rigidities will eventually cause organisational 
death as the firm becomes increasingly divorced from its environment. The East 
German system did not allow bankruptcy, hence this scenario was academic 
although that is no longer the case. 
Second, invest in the promotion of intellectual diversity. Third, invest in 
unlearning capabilities either provocatively, or as and when the need arises. We 
will now outline these last two strategies. 
2.3. i. Promotion of Intellectual Diversity - A Solution to Core Rigidities 
The process of exploration for alternative capabilities and organisational 
strategies is more likely to occur in a firm with differing perspectives on what 
the purpose of the firm is and what products and services it should deliver. The 
creation of new organisational knowledge is strongly influenced by the 
interaction between individual knowledge and the firms knowledge base. The 
firms knowledge is embedded it its routines, culture, group behaviours and 
hierarchy. On average the knowledge stored in these systems will be a more 
accurate reflection of reality than the individual's view. However, organisations 
are inanimate objects, it is only through the diversity of individuals knowledge 
that the firm can change its view of the world, and hence its capabilities (March 
1991).  
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Change is more likely to occur if the firm notices a gap between what its current 
combination of resources and capabilities can deliver, and what the customer 
wants over time. When noticing a serious value adding incongruity between 
market needs and the capabilities of the firm, individuals need to raise questions 
which highlight these incongruities. Such questions are more likely to come 
from organisational mavericks, people who have questioning minds, and the 
desire to express their ideas both to others and though the products and services 
they create. This is not a typical feature of people who seek to fit into the 
company or political party line. As such it is unlikely these maverick managers 
would have lasted long in the old GDR (East Germany). 
Another way to promote change in a firm's organisational knowledge is to 
introduce new people into the firm (Carley 1992; Simon 1992). Personnel 
turnover can occur when a firm is expanding, hence taking on new people, when 
people retire from the firm, or alternatively move onto other firms. The idea is 
that these new people can infuse the firm with new ideas. If they have past 
experience in another organisation then they can bring insights into alternative 
ways of running the business, thus enabling the firm to envision new methods of 
working. In a way this is partially what has occurred in the M&As of Western 
and Eastern firms, where new staff have been brought in.  
2.3. ii Unlearning - A Solution to Core Rigidities 
Unlearning is defined by Hedberg (1981) as a process through which learners 
discard knowledge which is misleading ... This process of unlearning can be 
equated with Schumpeter's process of creative destruction. 
On the knowledge management front new M&As were offered a work force 
prepared for unlearning of old capabilities and acceptance of new. They also 
were also offered a capability at knowledge application which matched, and may 
have exceeded Western firms. There were reasons some firms over-looked this 
benefit. In a society were personnel turnover was much higher in the lower 
ranks, western firms had developed complex systems of organisational routines 
and procedures which enabled it to preserve its production knowledge. 
Otherwise the firms knowledge, upon which its capabilities are based, could 
literally walk out the door as employees moved from one job to the next.  
For example in McDonalds there exist very detailed written procedures on the 
cooking of burgers, how long they can remain on the shelves before being sold 
or thrown out etc. They are detailed and established rules on the sequential 
interaction of individuals from the kitchen, to cleaning, to the sales counter. 
Staff receive on-the-job training into these procedures, reinforced through 
constant repetition. Such written procedures were less necessary in a GDR 
restaurant where staff remained in the same workplace, and often the same job, 
for life. In this environment, sequential interactions between individuals could 
have been ingrained in staff through organisational culture.  
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In a way one could say that organisational culture is a complex routine, 
embedded in which is the tacit knowledge of the collective organisational mind. 
One of the difficulties of this type of stored knowledge is that the beliefs and 
assumptions it generates are hard to clearly identify given that they are 
subconscious. This can lead to difficulties where these assumptions become 
removed from the reality of the organisational environment over time, but major 
decisions continue to be made based upon them. In the GDR the assumptions 
about the relationship between capital, labour and consumers became 
increasingly divorced from wider global realities, however the dogma of 
communism created a world in which broader realities were hidden from the 
populous.  
The surfacing and challenging of these assumptions is possible (Mason/ Mitroff 
1981), but real cultural change is a difficult task (Bate 1994). Hence, storage and 
integration of knowledge by embedding it in the organisational culture can be 
very efficient when first created, because it passes into the tacit knowledge bases 
of a wide number of individuals, however, as the environment alters the ability 
to unlearn such knowledge is a slow, laborious, highly costly, and often 
unsuccessful crusade (Hax/ Majluf 1984; Wilson 1992). Thus, in the long term 
storage of large amounts of knowledge within the organisational culture can lead 
to very inflexible capabilities. Here we see that change in East Germany firms is 
difficult without a crude removal of culture, as many firms tried via mass 
redundancies, or a direct inclusion of culture in their Merger and Acquisition 
strategy. Firms which addressed the issue of acculturation head on were, in our 
sample, more successful. 
3 Potential Competitive Advantages of CEE M&As 
We believe there is a very positive potential existing in M&As in Central and 
Eastern Europe, which when properly handled can produce competitive 
advantage. The first area of advantage to be examined builds on the discussion 
of learning literature in Section 2. The second and related area is the application 
of current knowledge in the current social context. The third area is a revue of 
the pros and cons of a developed group culture. Our final area, although there 
are surely others, is the field of change management. 
3.1 Advantages related to the field of learning - We identify three potential 
advantages: 
3.1. i Unlearning 
As discussed in 2c.ii, it has been noted (Bettis/ Prahalad, 1995) that learning in 
one period is a function of the level of unlearning in the previous period. 
Unlearning is a process through which learners discard knowledge especially 
obsolete and misleading knowledge (Hedberg 1981). This process has been 
Two-way learning in west/east mergers & acquisitions: Short term and long term viewpoints. 
JEEMS 2/ 1998 176 
equated by Imai et al. (1985) with Schumpeter’s process of creative destruction. 
The workers in Eastern and Central Europe have gone through a massive 
unlearning process with the collapse of command economy structures and 
ideologies, they can therefore be argued to be ideally poised to produce new 
knowledge more efficiently than their entrenched western counterparts. 
3.1. ii. Turnover/ Intellectual Diversity 
In order for an organisation to learn it needs turnover (Carley 1992; Simon 
1991). As up to 80% of the jobs in ex-combines have been rationalised away, 
the requirement for personnel turnover is certainly met in CEE M&As. 
However, turnover means not just losing positions but also bringing in new 
blood, the intellectual diversity discussed in section 2c.i. M&As, by the very fact 
that they are often accompanied by middle and top management turnover (Walsh 
1988), satisfy this requirement. This is true of all M&As, not just those with 
CEE firms, however East German M&As often saw initial very high 
management turnover, due to the weeding out of political appointees, usually 
occupying positions at the highest level. 
3.1. iii Educational standards 
Learning is facilitated by the ability of individuals to grasp concepts. This ability 
is developed in the schooling system and in this area, specifically in tertiary 
education and sciences, CEE countries were as advanced if not more so than 
some of their western neighbours. 
3.2 Application of Current Knowledge and Social Context 
Many authors have noted that a firm's social system plays an important role in 
the process of learning (Brown/ Duguid 1989; Imai et al. 1985; Kay 1993; Orr 
1990; Simon 1991). In deepening the firms current knowledge base managers 
often focus on changes in the levels of organisational slack and socialisation 
amongst individuals and groups inside the firm (Blacker 1995; Cyert/ March 
1963; Huber 1991; Nonaka/ Takeuchi 1995). To deepen knowledge three vital 
ingredients are needed: organisational slack, common codes and shared 
language, and the freedom to experiment. East German firms contained the first 
two in abundance.  
3.2. i Freedom to experiment: 
New owners of East German firms have the freedom to introduce experiments. 
In so doing they can combine the new diversity available from the West with a 
propensity to apply and deepen current knowledge bases. Combined this could 
lead to a powerful capability to both develop and deepen knowledge into 
successful commercial products and services.  
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3.2. ii Organisational Slack: 
It is widely recognised that slack permits a higher degree of interaction between 
people, thus facilitating the transfer of tacit knowledge across individuals 
(Huber 1991; Nonaka/ Takeuchi 1995). Polanyi (1966) notes that much of which 
we know cannot be easily communicated. This is tacit knowledge. It is a vital 
component of our day to day lives. If a capability relies upon tacit knowledge it 
is more likely to be a source of SCA. This is because the elements that drive the 
capability forward will be difficult to identify by competitors, and hence copy. If 
carefully managed organisational slack can foster the transfer of tacit knowledge 
between individuals and in a merger across organisations.  
It is important to initially identify what knowledge is tacitly stored inside the 
purchased unit. Once this knowledge is identified then it would be important for 
the M&A to develop strategies to nurture this knowledge and transfer it across 
the old organisational boundaries, embedding it in the routines, hierarchy, and 
culture of the new firm. Instead these firms viewed slack, or overlaps in 
employees duties and knowledge, as completely surplus to requirements and 
hence engaged in hasty mass redundancies. This phenomena is not confined to 
the East, there is anecdotal evidence in the stories of the privatisation of the UK 
water industry that suggests this many also occur in a long-term member of the 
western economy. 
Organisational slack may not always be used to foster knowledge sharing across 
individuals with the goal of discovering novel ways of combining the firm's 
current capabilities and resources to create new and improved products and 
services. The old GDR seems to be an extreme example of a phenomena 
observed by the economist Arrow (1974) when he noted that: To a large extent, 
channels of communication serve purposes other than diffusion of innovations - 
friendship, connivance - and the direction of diffusion may be dictated by factors 
in addition to profitability. Ghemawat (1991) reinforces Arrow's views by 
noting that slack needs to be carefully managed if it is not to be appropriated by 
non-owner stakeholders. 
3.2. iii. Common Codes and Shared Language 
For tacit knowledge to be transferred across individuals there is a need for social 
proximity and an overlap in task or knowledge bases. These are facilitated by 
organisational slack. This is not enough. It is necessary for people to be able to 
efficiently and effectively communicate with each other the knowledge which 
they wish to share. Shared experiences will offer some common grounds for 
understanding. A shared language, including culturally bound terms, is also 
required (Blacker 1995; Cohen/ Levinthal 1990; Pentland/ Rueter 1994). Shared 
language enables people to express their knowledge in terms the others 
understand. 
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Low personnel turnover, high slack, coupled with high degrees of socialisation 
inside and outside of work was likely to foster common language. Some 
combines in the GDR employed whole towns, e.g. Leuna. There was a very high 
degrees of social interaction between work mates when compared to the average 
Western firm. All this was likely to give the employees a relatively high degree 
of shared personal experiences, fostering transfer of tacit knowledge, coupled 
with a lower need to rely on relatively more inefficient explicit knowledge 
transfer mechanisms. Within the established group the potential to apply current 
knowledge bases is likely to have been relatively high, with the right 
motivational elements. However now with teams completely broken up and 
many new owners not recognising the need to develop a new common language 
with their East Germany employees for knowledge to be accessed and employed 
efficiently, then the opportunity to combine two unique capabilities may have 
passed. The East's knowledge management capability was in application, created 
through its high group orientated culture. The West's knowledge management 
strength was in its diversity of strategies and technology, created through its 
intellectual diversity, which avoided system wide core rigidities. Combining 
these knowledge management capabilities with access to new markets, 
technology, and capital could enable firms to develop a winning SCA. 
In entering into a merger with an East German firm we argue that one of the key 
elements to success is careful management of acculturation. This is because 
much of the most valuable knowledge and capabilities of East German firms are 
deeply embedded in their past organisational and societal culture. To 
successfully tap into these capabilities and leverage them across the new East-
West organisations then it is vital to engage in a process of creating a shared 
understanding of what the purpose and abilities of the firm is. This cannot be 
achieved without identifying the tacit knowledge bases of the East and West 
partners and their relationship to the performance of the firms. And that cannot 
be done without creation of a common language and organisational slack - both 
of which require successful acculturation. 
3.3 Group Culture 
Societies to the east of the iron curtain were organised down to the lowest level 
which was the group. Due to ideological and also control reasons the group was 
assigned enormous importance. We contend that because of this historical fact, 
the groundwork for inter-personal communication and trust within teams already 
existed. We have already noted in section 2 that the creation of knowledge by 
individuals is not a solitary, but rather a social process (Simon 1991). Teams can 
be critical in the development of knowledge and thus knowledge based 
competencies (Carley 1992; Imai et al. 1985; March 1991; Nonaka 1991, 1994). 
CEE M&As have workers with proven experience and aptitude of interacting in 
a group setting. This base is waiting to be exploited, albeit in multi-discipline 
team not the old production group settings. 
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Is there any research linking group culture with organisational effectiveness? 
Starting with the Hawthorne studies, 1924-1932 - see Mayo (1933), there has 
been an abundance of significant research on groups that has implications for 
organisational behaviour and management (Luthans 1992:350). Luthans goes on 
to summarise this research and its impact on effectiveness. 
Table 1: Summary of Research on the Impact That Groups Have on 
Organisational and Individual Behaviour 
The Impact of Groups on 
Organisational Effectiveness 
The Impact of Groups on Individual 
Employee Effectiveness 
Accomplishing tasks that could not be 
done by employees themselves 
Aiding in learning about the 
organisation and its environment 
Bringing a number of skills and talents 
to bear on complex difficult tasks 
Aiding about learning about oneself 
Providing a vehicle for decision 
making that permits multiple and 
conflicting views to be aired and 
considered 
Providing help in gaining new skills 
Providing an efficient means for 
organisational control of employee 
behaviour 
Obtaining valued rewards that are not 
attainable by oneself 
Facilitating changes in organisational 
policies or procedures 
Satisfying important personal needs, 
especially needs for social acceptance 
and affiliation 
Increasing organisational stability by 
transmitting shared beliefs and values 
to new employees 
 
Adapted from Nadler et al. (1979), in: Luthans 1992:351 
After the Hawthorne Studies further research using controlled experiments into 
group cohesiveness and the effect of such cohesiveness together with leadership 
had on productivity were carried out by Schachter et al.. (1951) and Berkowitz 
(1954). The results indicated, especially in the latter study, that highly cohesive 
groups which are well lead obtain the highest productivity. Paradoxically 
cohesive groups which were poorly lead obtained the lowest levels of 
productivity. Low cohesive groups regardless of leadership quality fell between 
the two extremes of the cohesive groups. The implications for management 
being that a group when well handled is a most valuable productive tool, 
however when mishandled the consequences can be dire. As already noted East 
German industry was based on the group (Kader) and therefore transformation 
attempts would seem to have most potential success if the group was maintained 
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and given strong leadership. The results of Schachter's work are summarised in 
diagram format in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: The pitchfork results from the Schachter study 
Productivity        Hi Co. + Leadership 
 
         Low Co. + Leadership 
 
         Control 
 
         Low Co. - Leadership 
 
         Hi Co. - Leadership 
 
         Time 
As per Luthans 1992:352 
Hi Co. = High level of cohesiveness in the group 
Low Co. = Low level of cohesiveness in the group 
+ Leadership = positive, strong leadership (induction or influence in Schachter's language) 
- Leadership = negative, weak leadership (induction or influence in Schachter's language) 
3. 4 Advantages in the field of change management: Crises or catastrophes 
propagate and force acceptance of radical change 
According to Huff, Huff & Thomas, 1992, change takes place when stress (the 
dissatisfaction which signals the need for renewal) overcomes inertia 
(commitment to current strategy). The idea of change being the outcome of the 
interaction of forces of stress and inertia is based on the concept of force field 
analysis from Lewin, 1947. Here change is evolutionary and incremental (Quinn 
1978) in nature, so long as the opposing forces are matched and moderate. 
However with major environmental or internal change forces occurring, stress 
and inertia will be anything but moderate and will not cancel out. Here change is 
sudden and revolutionary, Miller & Friesen (1984) call it a quantum leap. 
Strebel 1994 created an example of a general model which shows both 
revolutionary and evolutionary change together but separated by breakpoints. 
CEE firms subject to M&As have been exposed to massive levels of both 
external (due to the fall of the command economy) and internal (take-over by 
foreigners) stress. East Germany is probably the most extreme example of 
abruptness, due to the factors discussed in the introduction. At the other end of 
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the spectrum some CEE countries have, until now, experienced levels of stress 
which have only caused evolutionary change, e.g. Slovenia (Whitley et al. 
1997). 
To summarise, East German M&As have experienced massive stress and thus 
have the potential, if they survive, to successfully accomplish revolutionary 
change or transformation. It is our thesis that comparable M&As taking place in 
western economies have lower levels of stress (especially external) and thus less 
potential to transform themselves. 
4 Acculturation in Mergers and Acquisitions 
The intermingling of two cultures is called acculturation, a term borrowed from 
anthropology (Berry 1980). When two firms combine then two cultures do so as 
well. These cultures can be either national, organisational or as in the case of 
this study, both. Cross-national M&As have by definition to combine differing 
national cultures with varying levels of psychic distance (O'Grady/ Lane 1996) 
alongside differing firm cultures, a process called double layered acculturation 
by Barkema et al. (1996). Psychic distance is not synonymous with nationality. 
O'Grady and Lane (1996:312) extend the normal view of psychic distance as a 
measure of national cultural divergence to include structural (legal and 
administrative systems) and language differences as well. There seems to be an 
appreciable psychic distance between West and East Germans although they 
both now have common German passports,(see: Lang 1994; Thomson 1996). 
Because of this inter-German psychic distance paradox, there are inherent 
difficulties in trying to simplify the measurement of psychic distance in East 
German acquisitions down to West German and non-West German (foreign) 
take-overs. Many of the foreign M&As were negotiated, co-ordinated and 
operationalised by the West German subsidiary of the mother company. Can 
such a take-over be then categorised as a foreign purchase? Even if this is the 
case, does this necessarily mean large psychic distance? Even when no West 
German subsidiary existed, the foreign firms often hired in West German 
professional managers to run key areas in the acquired company. There is 
obviously a continuum of foreignness reflected in psychic distance 
measurements, running from extremely foreign through to almost West German. 
Each of the M&As therefore fits onto a psychic distance continuum reflecting: 
(a) the number of imported managers - the bigger the number of home country 
and third country managers, not very prevalent in the sample, the more foreign 
the classification. More relevant was the number of imported West German 
managers which reduced the foreigness classification. Latest research (Lang 
1997) shows that even though absolute numbers of foreign or West German 
managers operating in East Germany may be small, they tend to be operating at 
the highest level and in the most critical areas (finance, marketing, strategy). 
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Also in the formula was (b) the influence of any West German subsidiary, both 
at the time of the M&A and also at the present.  
Even this differentiation between national and organisational cultures does not 
encompass the whole complexity of foreign M&As. Very et al. (1996:60) 
investigated the matter further under the heading of acculturative stress. 
Acculturative stress being not just the difference between 'what was' before the 
M&A and 'what is' afterwards. It occurs when expectations of some proper state 
of affairs as to 'what ought to be' are not fulfilled (David 1977). Acculturative 
stress need not be a negative factor, as is well known some sort of stress is 
necessary for life in general and commercial development in particular. Indeed 
Very et al. (1996) found that 'to the extent that the buying firm's culture better 
addresses the acquired firm's normative expectations, differences between the 
two cultures may sometimes signify sources of acculturative attraction, not 
stress'. So the forces at work depend upon expectations not necessarily on the 
reality. Interviews in this research showed again and again that the East German 
expectations of what western firms could offer in the way of new machinery, 
equipment, training, technology etc., were utopian. The idea that everything was 
better and more modern in the west was a typical phenomena of forced isolation 
and the resultant lack of knowledge. The reality of mass lay-off, disappearance 
of customers and western managers who proved to be fallible, like all humans, 
was a shocking realisation (Maaz 1993).  
We define acquisitions here as the buying up of enough stock to have control 
over decision making in the boardroom. This begs the question:  
Question 1: In an acquisition when the acquirer (in this case a 
 western firm) is financially and technically strong, will 
 any acculturation takes place on the acquirer’s terms?  
Mergers are defined here as the sharing of a firm's stock to the extent that 
decision making at the board level is not effectively in the hands of the acquirer. 
When however a merger takes place, the power position of the eastern firm is 
higher. 
Question 2: Do mergers mean that there is more opportunity for the 
 eastern culture to influence the incoming western culture, 
 and for learning and information exchange to be two 
 way?  
These two questions will be examined using the model shown in Figure 2. The 
model contains the mode of combination (merger or acquisition), the type of 
acculturation and five other forces on the M&A. The types of acculturation 
(integration, assimilation, separation and deculturation) are based on Mirvis & 
Sales (1984), whilst the model itself is an extension of Nahavandi & 
Malekzadeh (1988). 
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Figure 2: A model of factors affecting potential success or failure in west/east 
M&As 
          
Types of  acculturation Types of acculturation
Integration Non-Integration
- Assimilation
- Separation
- Deculturation
          
Forces, 1-5
1. Psychic Distance
2. Mode of acquisition, merger or take-over
reflecting the power of acquirer vs acquired
3.Time since M&A
4. New Managers - foreign, West German, East German?
- Coming from acquirer?
5. Varying expectations of the two parties
Congruence Lack of congruence
Low levels of acculturative stress High levels of acculturative
stress
Long term success Long term failure
 
Adopted from that shown in Thomson (1996) 
The end stages of the above model need some explanation. What do we mean by 
success and failure in the long term. Failure is taken here to mean that the firm 
does not still exists after 5 years and/or has changed the original purchaser. 
Interestingly enough, using this definition, half of all mergers and take-overs 
fail, even in a domestic setting (O’Connell 1985). The opposite of failure is 
success. Success has many definitions depending on whose viewpoint is used. 
Profits are success for shareholders in neo-classical economics. Continued 
existence (longevity, see Barkema et al. 1996) and hence employment is success 
for employees and other stakeholders e.g. local government.  
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The aims of this paper are to attempt to gauge the basis for future success, both 
profits and longevity, by looking at the causes of differences in the intensity of 
acculturative stress. The higher the intensity of acculturative stress, the less 
likely is a level of empowerment and shared vision of the remaining original 
management and workforce upon which future success is dependent. However 
this future success can also be viewed as time dependent.  
It is useful here to revue definitions of short term and long term. The classical 
economic example of the long term is the time in which it is possible to change 
the most fixed factor of production, often to build a new factory (Lipsey 
1983:223). Under this definition the short term is probably only one year or so 
and concomitantly the long term anything beyond that. We have taken a more 
generous definition of long term - the period of time long enough for all the 
firm's sunk commitments to come to an end (Baumol/ Binder 1991:493). We 
feel that this definition will increase the short term time span considerably, 
which is necessary for the conditions existing during our study in East Germany. 
Commitments made with the privatisation authority (the THA) locked in many 
new owners of M&As to certain investment and employment quotas forcing the 
short term in these cases up to the millennium. 
5 Data collection issues 
The issues in the field of west/east M&As highlighted above were raised in a 
series of 36 in-depth, open-ended interviews carried out in 1995-96 in six 
west/east M&As in the East Germany. See Table 2 for details. Although the 
results of such a sample cannot be generalised to East German industry as such, 
they did show linkages between the literature on learning and knowledge, the 
level of acculturation and the mode of combination (whether merger or 
acquisition). Further research on these linkages using a representative sample 
could check for a wider generalisability both in East Germany and in other 
transforming economies. As discussed, the M&As were not chosen to achieve 
generalisability but it may be worth reviewing some of the research criteria 
which would have an influence on a study aiming for generalisability. Sector 
influence: the majority did fall within one sector (services). Due to the de-
industrialisation of the ex-GDR, services are now of more importance than 
manufacturing. Age of the firm: Each firm was privatised within two years of 
reunification, therefore they were all of a similar age (approximately 5 years 
since change of ownership). As well as firm age, the age of the interviewees is 
of importance. There was a marked skewing of the age profile in almost all the 
firms towards older, but not very old employees. This phenomena occurred due 
to the social criteria used in downsizing - first in, last out, except where early 
retirement could be taken. The interviewees' ages reflected the age profile of 
their firms. Location: all except two were based in the chemical triangle in the 
South East of the Neue Bundesländer. There are sizeable regional variations in 
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the Neue Bundesländer, ranging from an agricultural north, the special capital 
function in Berlin to areas of former heavy industry in the south. Size: the 
number of employees varied from 20 up to 2,100, but the core companies were 
between 50 and 400, i.e. medium sized organisations. Capital intensity: 
Companies A&B inherited and expanded a large capital (machinery and plant) 
infrastructure. All the other firms, with the possible exception of Company F, 
were mainly made up of offices or laboratories, i.e. low capital values. 
Table 2: Foreign M&As in the Research 
 
 Company A - a large utilities operation, with approximately 2,100 employees. 
Situated in Saxony and Sachsen-Anhalt. 
 Company B - a manufacturer of heavy electrical supply equipment, with 
approximately 400 employees. Situated in Berlin (East).  
 Company C - in planning and plant assembly within the chemical and water 
sector, with approximately 50 employees. Situated in Sachsen-Anhalt. 
 Company D - in planning and plant assembly within the chemical and water 
sector, with approximately 240 employees. Situated in Saxony. 
 Company E - a research provider in the agricultural industry, with 
approximately 20 employees. Based in Northern West Germany with only 
sales and contract production in East Germany. 
 Company F - a research provider and also producer of speciality chemicals, 
with approximately 100 employees. Situated in Saxony. 
 
6 Actual Data Results 
We return to question 1 posed in Section 4, namely:  
 In an acquisition when the acquirer (in this case a western 
firm) is financially and technically strong, will any 
acculturation takes place on the acquirer’s terms?  
At the macro (national) level there is much evidence to support this contention. 
According to a longitudinal study by speech expert Norbert Dittmar (1997) of 
the Freie Universität Berlin, in cases where West and East Germans used 
different words for the same object, then the West German words have become 
the accepted ones, right across the board.  
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Table 3: Summary of M&As 
Source Merger or 
Acquisition 
Psychic 
Distance 
New External 
Managers 
Acculturation  
plus  
/Sub-Division 
Varying ex- 
pectation 
Differences 
Intensity of 
Acculturative 
Stress 
 
Company A (US) 
 
Acquisition High, no WG 
subsidiaries 
CEO only US, 
rest East 
German 
Integration/ 
Multicultural 
Large Medium   
Company B (GB) 
 
Acquisition High, no WG 
subsidiaries 
Very small 
number of 
West/East mgrs 
Integration/ 
Pluralism 
Not too large Medium-High  
Company C 
Sweden 
 
Merger High, no WG 
subsidiaries 
At start one 
Swede. Now 
only East 
Germans 
Integration/ 
Multicultural 
Low Low  
Company D (GB) Merger High, no WG 
subsidiaries 
One British rest 
East German 
Integration/ 
Multicultural 
Low Low  
Company E (GB) 
 
Acquisition Medium, WG 
Subsidiary 
Several from 
West Germany 
especially in key 
areas 
Assimilation/ 
Pressure Cooker 
Not too large Medium  
Company F (US) 
 
Merger Medium, no WG 
subsid. but WG 
input 
Top managers 
from US or WG 
via the THA 
Rejection/ 
Withdrawal 
Large High  
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At the micro level of the firm, as researched in this study, the importance of a 
shared language and common codes across the group has already been dealt with 
in section 3. Likewise at the micro level our results do not conclusively support 
the contention in question 1 that acculturation always takes place on the terms of 
the stronger party. The researched acquisitions showed very quick changes in 
such areas as technology adaptation, organisation structures, management 
techniques and the cutting of personnel and groups. Here the differences in 
speed of changes were dependent upon the culture of the acquiring firm, to use 
Hofstede’s classification (Hofstede 1991), the more masculine the acquirer the 
quicker the changes. All the acquisitions could be classified as having a medium 
to a high intensity of acculturative stress. There were however differences due to 
the usage of Eastern managers (the higher the number, the less radical the 
changes). Mergers on the other hand, with the exception of Company F, had low 
intensities of acculturative stress. Mergers showed slower adoption of, and less 
radical changes in the above technical areas, due to moderating and accepted 
influence of the eastern managers and culture. Company F turned out to be very 
different from the other five companies. 25% of the voting shares stayed in the 
hands of the privatisation authority, which caused large arguments about 
strategic direction and investment decisions. These disagreements reflected right 
through the work force and caused very high acculturative stress. So high indeed 
that eventually the company was demerged and returned to the privatisation 
authority. The lesson here seems to be that it is not the variable merger which 
holds the key to success, rather it is the level of acculturative stress. High stress 
often reflects an unhappy marriage of interests, whereas low stress points to 
partners who complement and attract. The other mergers had private sector 
partners which seemed to preclude some of antagonistic goals experienced by 
Company F and its public sector partner. 
The results from mergers point towards tentative support for question 2, which 
was:  
 Do mergers mean that there is more opportunity for the 
eastern culture to influence the incoming western culture, 
and for learning and information exchange to be two way?  
As already mentioned, the presence and importance of Eastern managers seemed 
to mediate the imposition of radical change. It was reported that the Eastern 
managers were able to keep some of the existing procedures and structures, thus 
incubating a feeling of two-way influence as reflected in lower levels of 
acculturative stress. We noted in section 2 that management had certain options 
to store and integrate knowledge. Routines are one of these options. We argue 
that those routines which have been preserved from the past in mergers were 
accepted and internalised by the work force and as such were excellent vehicles 
for knowledge storage and integration. The routines and direction imposed by 
the buyer in acquisitions were not so accepted and internalised. The difference is 
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one of agreement/non-agreement with the goals and directives which, according 
to the learning literature, will show up differing potentials for learning and later 
in business performance. It should be noted that Question 2 contains an implicit 
comparison between the different modes of combination, mergers and 
acquisitions. Interviews in the acquired firms reported more imposed decisions 
from headquarters, which was reflected in larger expectation differences and 
acculturative stress levels. 
The results are summarised in Table 3. 
7 Success both immediate and potential 
Do the above results tell us anything about what is proving the best way to do 
business in a west/east M&A? The answer seems to depend in part upon the time 
span of the investigation. Acquisitions have better initial results in so far as they 
are quicker to adapt to the new environment. However we argue that they have 
less potential for future success as they have not unlearned and are continuing 
the western recipes (Grinyer/ Spender 1979) which may not be relevant in the 
newly forming eastern market economies. The parallel with Schumpeter’s 
dominant logic and Miller’s Ikarius Paradox (Miller 1993) is instructional. 
Mergers have worse initial results, in so far as they are slower to adapt to the 
new environment, but in our opinion a higher potential for future success. Our 
faith in their future is based on the perceived democratic integration of the two 
cultures, reflected in lower levels of acculturative stress. The higher integration 
in many mergers motivates the eastern workforce to accept new ideas and learn 
and acquire new knowledge. As already stated the results are not generalisable 
and need to be checked over time to see if our prognosis of success comes about. 
Indeed long term studies in East Germany are thin on the ground with the 
exception of Frese/ Hilligloh (1994). 
References 
Amit, R./ Schoemaker, P. (1993): Strategy Assets and Organisational Rent, in: Strategic 
Management Journal, Vol. 14. 
Argyris, C./ Schon, D. (1978): Organisational Learning, Allison-Wesley, Reading, Mass. 
Arrow, K. (1962): The Economic Implications of Learning by Doing, in: Review of 
Economic Studies, Vol. 29, June. 
Arrow, K. (1974): Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, Amsterdam, North-Holland 
Publishing. 
Barkema, H.G./ Ball, J.H.J./ Pennings, J.M. (1996): Foreign entry, cultural barriers and 
learning, in: Strategic Management Journal, Volume 17, pp. 151-166. 
Barney, J. (1991): Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, in: Journal of 
Management, Vol. 17, No.1. 
J. Neil Thomson / Peter Mc Namara 
JEEMS 2/ 1998 189
Bate, P. (1994): Strategies for Cultural Change, Oxford, Butterworth Heinemann. 
Baumol, W.J./ Binder, A.L. (1991): Economics, principles and policy, San Diego, p.493. 
Berkowitz, L. (1954): Group standards, cohesiveness and productivity, in: Human Relations 
Vol. 7, No. 4, pp. 509-519. 
Berry, J.W. (1980), Social & Cultural Change, in: Triandis, H.C./ Brislin, R.W. (Eds.): 
Handbook on cross-cultural psychology, Vol. 5, Boston. 
Bettis, R./ Prahalad C. (1995): The Dominant Logic: Retrospective and Extension, in: 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 16. 
Black, J./ Boal, K. (1994): Strategic Resources: Traits, Configurations and Paths to 
Sustainable Competitive Advantage, in: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 15. 
Blacker, F. (1995): Knowledge, Knowledge Work and Organisations: An Overview and 
Interpretation, in: Organisation Studies, Vol. 16, Issue. 6. 
Brown, J./ Duguid, P. (1989): Innovation at the Workplace, a Perspective on Organisational 
Learning, Paper presented at the CMU Conference on Organisational Learning, May. 
Carley, K. (1992), Organisational Learning & Personnel Turnover, in: Organisational 
Science, Vol. 3., No. 1, Feb. 
Cohen, W./ Levinthal, D. (1990): Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and 
Innovations, in: Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 35. 
Collis, D. (1991): A Resource Based Analysis of Global Competition: The Analysis of the 
Global Bearings Industry, in: Strategic Management Journal, Special Issue, Summer. 
Connor, K. (1991): A Historical Comparison of Resource-Based Theory and Five Schools of 
Thought within Industrial Organisation Economics: Do We Have a New Theory of the 
Firm ?, in: Journal of Management, Vol. 17, No. 1. 
Cyert/ March (1963): A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, New Jersey, Prentice Hall 
International. 
David, K. (1977): Epilogue: what shall we mean by changing identities? in: Very et al. 
(1996). 
Dittmar, N. (1997): Die langsame Wende beim sprechen, in: The Berliner Zeitung, 
12.03.1997: VI. 
Frese/ Hilligloh (1994) in Tromsdorff, G. (Editor): Psychologische Aspekte des sozio-
politischen Wandels in Ostdeutschland, de Gruyter Verlag, (1994), Berlin. 
Ghemawat, P. (1991): Commitment: The Dynamic of Strategy, New York: The Free Press. 
Grant, R. (1991): The Resource-Based Theory of Competitive Advantage: Implications for 
Strategy Formulation, in: California Management Review, Vol. 33. 
Grant, R. (1996a): Prospecting in Dynamically-Competitive Environments: Organisational 
Capability as Knowledge Integration, in: Organisational Science. 
Grant, R. (1996b): Toward a Knowledge Based Theory of the Firm, in: Strategic Management 
Journal, Vol. 17, Winter Special Issue. 
Grinyer, P.H./ Spender J.-C. (1979): Turnaround - Managerial Recipes for Strategic Success, 
Associated Business Press, London. 
Two-way learning in west/east mergers & acquisitions: Short term and long term viewpoints. 
JEEMS 2/ 1998 190 
Hamel, G./ Prahalad, C. (1990): The Core Competence of the Corporation, in: Harvard 
Business Review, May-June. 
Hamel, G./ Prahalad, C. (1994): Competing for the Future, Massachusetts, Harvard Business 
School Press. 
Hampden-Turner, C. (1990): Charting the corporate mind: from dilemma to strategy, Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford. 
Hax, A./ Majluf, N. (1984): Strategic Management: An Integrative Perspective, Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey, Prentice Hall Inc. 
Hayek, F. (1945): The Use of Knowledge in Society, in: American Economic Review, Vol. 35 
No. 4. 
Hedberg, B. (1981): How Organisations Learn and Unlearn, in: Nystrom, P./ Starbuck, W. 
(Eds.): Handbook of Organisational Design, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, NY. 
Hofstede, G. (1991): Cultures & Organisations: Software of the Mind, McGraw-Hill, London. 
Huber, G. (1991): Organisational Learning: The Contributing Processes and the Literature, in: 
Organisational Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, February. 
Huff, J.O./ Huff, A.S./ Thomas, H. (1992): Strategic renewal and the interaction of 
cumulative stress and inertia, in: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13, pp. 55-75. 
Imai, K./ Nonaka, I./ Tackeuchi, H. (1985): Managing the New Product Development 
Process: How Japanese Companies Learn and Unlearn, in: Clark, K./ Hayes, R./ 
Lorenz, C.: The Uneasy Alliance: Managing the Productivity-Technology Dilemma, 
Harvard Business Press, Cambridge MA. 
Kay, J. (1993): Foundations of Corporate Success: How business strategies add value, Oxford 
University Press.  
Klein, J. (1989): Parenthetic Learning in Organisations: Toward the Unlearning of the 
Unlearning Model, in: Journal of Management Studies, No. 26, pp. 3, May. 
Kogut, B./ Zander, U. (1992): Knowledge of the Firm. Combinative Capabilities and the 
Replication of Technology, in: Organisation Science, Vol. 3, No. 3, August.  
Lang, R. (1994): Führungskräfte in Ostdeutschland: Forschungsbericht zum Projekt SOKULT 
92, Arbeitspapier 03, Technische Universität Chemnitz-Zwickau. 
Lang, R. (1997): Speech to the opening of the III Ost Forum, Chemnitz, March. 
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992): Core Capabilities and Core Rigidities: A Paradox in Managing 
New Product development, in: Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 13. 
Levinthal, D./ March, J. (1993): The Myopia of Learning, in: Strategic Management Journal, 
Vol. 14. 
Lewin, K. (1947): Frontiers in group dynamics, in: Human Relations, No. 1, pp. 5-41. 
Luthans, F. (1992): Organizational behavior, Singapore, McGraw-Hill. 
Maaz, H.-J. (1993): Das gestürzte Volk, München, Knaur Verlag. 
Mahoney, J. (1995): The Management of Resources and the Resource of Management, in: 
Journal of Business Research, Vol. 33, Management Journal, Vol. 7: 119-140. 
March, J. (1991): Exploration and Exploitation in Organisational Learning, in: Organisational 
Science, Vol. 2, No. 1. 
J. Neil Thomson / Peter Mc Namara 
JEEMS 2/ 1998 191
Marshall, A. (1965): Principles of Economics, London, Macmillan. 
Mason, R./ Mitroff, I. (1981): Challenging Strategic Planning Assumptions, New York, 
Wiley-Interscience, John Wiley and Sons. 
Mayo, E. (1933): The human problems of an industrial civilization, London: McMillan. 
Mc Namara, P./ Baden-Fuller, C. (1997): Three Traps Facing Knowledge Exploitation in 
Firms, Eastern Academy of Management Conference Proceedings.  
Miller, D./ Friesen, P.H. (1984): Organisations: a quantum view. Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cliff, NJ. 
Miller, D. (1993): The Architecture of Simplicity, in: Academy of Management Review, Vol. 
18, No. 1. 
Nadler, D.A./ Hackman, J.R./ Lawler, E.E. (1979): Managing Organizational Behavior, 
Boston, Mass., Little Brown. 
Nelson, R./ Winter, S. (1982): An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change, Harvard 
University Press, Mass. 
Nonaka, I. (1991): The Knowledge Creating Company, in: Harvard Business Review, 
November-December. 
Nonaka, I. (1994): A Dynamic Theory of Organisational Knowledge Creation, in: 
Organisational Science, Vol. 5, No. 1, Feb. 
Nonaka, I./ Takeuchi, H. (1995): The Knowledge Creating Company, Oxford University 
Press. 
O'Connell, J.M. (1985) in: Business Week: 88-100, cited in: Walsh J.P. (1989): Doing a deal: 
merger and acquisition negotiations and their impact upon target company top 
management, in: Strategic Management Journal, Vol 9, pp. 173-183. 
O'Grady, S./ Lane, H.W. (1996): The psychic distance paradox., in: Journal of international 
Business Studies, 2nd Quarter. 
Orr, J. (1990): Sharing Knowledge, Celebrating Identity: Community Memory in a Service 
Culture, in: Middleton, D./ Edwards, D. (Editors): Collective Remembering, Newbury 
Park, Sage. 
Pendler, M./ Burgoyne, J./ Boydell, T. (1991): The Learning Company, McGraw Hill, New 
York. 
Penrose, E. (1959): The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Basil Blackwell, Oxford. 
Pentland, B./ Rueter, H. (1994): Organisational Routines as Grammars of Action, in: 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 39. 
Polanyi, M. (1966): The Tacit Dimension, Routledge Kegan & Paul Ltd., London. 
Quinn, J.B. (1978): Strategic change: logical incrementalism, in: Sloan Management Review, 
1, No. 20. 
Schachter, S. et al. (1951): An experimental study of cohesiveness and productivity, in: 
Human Relations, August 1951, pp. 229-239. 
Senge, P.M. (1990): The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organisation, 
Doubleday, NY. 
Two-way learning in west/east mergers & acquisitions: Short term and long term viewpoints. 
JEEMS 2/ 1998 192 
Simon, H. (1991): Bounded Rationality and Organisational Learning, in: Organisational 
Science, Vol. 2. 
Stigler, G. (1968): The Economics of Information, in: Stigler, G.: The Organisation of 
Industry, Homewood, Irwin. 
Strebel, P. (1994): Choosing the right change path, in: California Management Review, 
Winter Edition. 
Teece, D. (1977): Technology Transfer by Multinational Firms: The Resource Cost of 
Transferring Technological Know-How, in: The Economic Journal, Vol. 87. 
Teece, D./ Pisano, G./ Schuen, A. (1990): Firm Capabilities, Resources and the Concept of 
Strategy, Consortium on Competitiveness and Co-operation Working Paper #90-9, 
University of California at Berkeley, Centre for Research in Management, Berkeley, 
CA. 
Thomson, J.N. (1996): Take-overs and acculturation: Linkages from East German 
privatisations to workforce integration, in: Journal of Eastern Europe Management 
Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 25-46. 
Very, P./ Lubatkin, M./ Calori, R. (1996): A cross-national assessment of acculturative stress 
in recent European mergers, in: International Studies of Management and 
Organisation, Vol. 26, No 1, pp. 59-86. 
Walsh, J.P. (1988): Top management turnover following mergers and acquisitions, in: 
Strategic Management Journal, Vol 9, pp. 173-183. 
Whitley, R./ Jacklie, M./ Hocevar, M. (1997): Success without shock therapy in Eastern 
Europe: The case of Slovenia, WZB Berlin Presentation, Feb. 
Wilson D. (1992): A Strategy of Change: Concepts and Controversies in the Management of 
Change, Routledge, London/ New York. 
